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TAKEOVERS
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mike burkart
fausto panunzi
A takeover typically involves much more than the mere transfer of ownership since
the acquired firm subsequently undergoes a major reorganization. Its divisions are
merged with or subordinated to those of the acquiring firm, divested, or even dis-
solved. Furthermore, such restructuring takes hold of entire industries as takeovers
occur in waves and are within each wave clustered by industries (Andrade, Mitchell,
and Staﬀord 2001).
Whether these changes primarily create or destroy value, or redistribute wealth
among diﬀerent constituencies, such as employees and shareholders, is the subject
of a long-standing debate. Initially, the controversy revolved around the gains from
realizing economies of scale and scope on the one hand, and the cost of concentrated
economic power to competitors, labour, and consumers on the other hand. In the
mid-1950s, tender oﬀers emerged as a new form of takeover in the UK and some years
later also in the USA (Singh 1971). Contrary to mergers, tender oﬀers allow bidders to
bypass management by making an oﬀer directly to target shareholders. In this form,
takeovers can have a motive apart from spurring firm growth or exploiting synergies,
namely rectifying managerial failure.1
During the takeover wave of the 1980s hostile tender oﬀers became a regular mode
of acquisition in the UK and USA. For instance, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) report
that almost a quarter of the large US corporations received a hostile bid during
that time. To be certain, the majority of acquisitions during that time were friendly,
We thank Colin Mayer (the editor) for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 Prior to the appearance of tender oﬀers, controlling blocks had to be accumulated through individual
trades, and proxy fights—which is to say direct voting by the firm’s existing shareholders—were the
principal mechanism for a hostile change of management (Hansmann 1996).
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negotiated with the target management.2 Outside the UK and USA, the incidence of
takeovers during the 1980s was much lower, and hostile takeovers—in the sense of
tender oﬀers launched in the market—were extremely rare if not non-existent. The
1990s saw takeover activities rebound to unprecedented levels in the USA but with a
substantially lower incidence of hostile bids (Holmström and Kaplan 2001). Europe
and Asia experienced a massive surge in takeover activity, though hostile bids outside
the UK remained rare until the end of the 1990s. In 1999 a significant number of
hostile bids occurred in continental Europe, including some high-profile cases such
as the Vodafone–Mannesmann deal.
Although hostile bids are primarily an Anglo-American phenomenon and occa-
sional events even in these countries, they have long been at the centre of the takeover
debate—at least among financial economists. This focus is in part a reflection of the
media exposure, public interest, and fierce criticisms that hostile takeovers in the
1980s provoked, notably those involving very large corporations, the heavy use of
leverage, and the subsequent sell-oﬀ of numerous divisions. More importantly, hos-
tile takeovers are a mechanism to discipline managers and thereby address problems
raised by the separation of ownership and control. Indeed, a functioning takeover
market is the most direct way to achieve control contestability which many commen-
tators consider an essential component of an eﬀective governance system (Berglöf
et al. 2003). In recent years, this view has also gained support among European regula-
tors and politicians, as the discussions surrounding the European Takeover Directive
show. In particular, the European Commission and its expert group sought to open
up Europe for takeovers to promote restructuring.3 According to the Commission,
Europe badly needs more restructuring if it wants to accomplish the goal, set forth in
the 2000 Lisbon Declaration, to become the world’s most dynamic economic region.
The existing research on takeovers is vast and covers a wide range of topics.
In this survey,4 we focus on takeovers as a remedy for managerial failure and
the incentive problems inherent in control transactions. Much of this literature
presupposes a publicly listed target firm with dispersed ownership and with no
takeover barriers, making shares and their votes freely transferable. Yet, the available
evidence on ownership structures demonstrates that dispersed ownership of large
firms is rare outside the United States (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
1999). In Europe, dispersed ownership is the prevalent organizational form only in
2 Even at their peak hostile bids never represented more than 30% of all US transactions (Schwert
2000). The small number of hostile takeovers underestimates, however, their impact as many friendly
transactions would (might) not have been done but for the background threat of a hostile bid.
3 After the European Parliament rejected the proposed directive in 2001, the Commission appointed
a ‘High Level Group of Company Law Experts’ under the chairmanship of Jaap Winter to provide inde-
pendent advice. The Winter Report’s most radical proposal is the so-called breakthrough rule (European
Commission 2002). It stipulates that a party owning a qualified majority (75%) of the equity capital can
undo any statutory defences, including any diﬀerentiation of votes. Due to tremendous opposition the
breakthrough rule was omitted from the directive that was finally adopted on 22 December 2003.
4 There are several reviews of the theoretical and empirical research on takeovers, including Andrade,
Mitchell, and Staﬀord 2001; Bhagat, Shleifer, and vishny 1990; Becht, Bolton, and Röell 2003; Bruner 2002;
Holmström and Kaplan 2001; Hirshleifer 1995; Jensen 1988; McCahery et al. 2004; Scherer 1988; and von
Thadden 1990.
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the United Kingdom and Ireland where more than 60 per cent of the listed firms
are widely held (Faccio and Lang 2002). By contrast, continental European firms
typically have a large shareholder, though there is considerable variation in the extent
of ownership concentration across countries. In half of the listed non-financial firms
in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Italy a single shareholder controls more than 50
per cent of the votes. In Dutch, Spanish, and Swedish firms the median blockholder
holds 43.5, 34.5, and 34.9 per cent, respectively (Barca and Becht 2001). A distinctive
feature of this survey is that it also discusses in some detail how the presence of both
minority and majority blocks aﬀects the incidence and eﬃciency of control transfers.
We note the implications for regulatory policy throughout the chapter.
This essay proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the concept of the market for
corporate control and discusses the eﬃciency eﬀects of takeovers. Section 2 examines
the tender oﬀer process, and Section 3 explores control transfers of firms whose
ownership structure is not dispersed. Section 4 concludes.
1. Efficiency of Takeovers
.............................................................................................................................................
The academic literature on the market for corporate control and the term itself
originate from Manne (1965). In this market shareholders can sell, possibly against
the will of the incumbent management, the control (rights) over the firm to an
outsider. Given that the share price reflects (expected) firm performance, an outsider
who is better able to run the firm finds it profitable to acquire control in order to
subsequently employ the firm’s assets more profitably. Moreover, competition among
outsiders or, in the parlance of Jensen and Ruback (1983), competing management
teams ensures that resources flow to their highest-value use. Eﬃciency is increased
ex post by replacing managers who are either less competent or are not acting in
the shareholders’ best interest. Hence, the takeover mechanism ensures that firms
which do not maximize profits do not survive, even if market forces on the product
and input markets fail to eliminate them. In addition, the mere threat of a takeover
raises eﬃciency ex ante as it disciplines managers, thereby reducing the agency costs
stemming from the separation of ownership and control (Grossman and Hart 1980a;
Scharfstein 1988).
This line of reasoning presupposes that takeovers are motivated by value im-
provements brought about either by exploiting synergies or by correcting ineﬃcient
managerial behaviour. It further assumes that the takeover market operates eﬃciently,
notably that a firm whose current share price is less than it could be under the control
of a diﬀerent party is indeed acquired by that party. The question whether or not these
two conditions are met, or more generally, whether the market for corporate control
operates eﬃciently, is the subject of numerous theoretical and empirical studies. The
various caveats boil down to two assertions: On the one hand, frictions in the takeover
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market result in too few value-improving takeovers, and on the other hand, takeovers
may succeed even though they do not create value. In addition, it is argued that
the existence of the takeover threat may well exacerbate the agency conflict between
managers and shareholders, rather than mitigate it. In what follows, we review the
debate over the eﬃciency of the takeover mechanism in more detail. Due to the large
representation of studies on US takeovers, the discussion relies heavily on the US
experience, and reported findings refer to US evidence, unless stated otherwise.
1.1. Disciplinary Takeovers
As described above, one takeover motive is to improve target firm performance by
altering the strategies of the incumbent managers and possibly replacing them. Such
disciplinary takeovers occur when the firms’ internal governance mechanisms fail
to prevent managers from pursuing their own goals.5 This problem is particularly
pertinent for cash-rich firms that enable managers to undertake unprofitable but
power-enhancing investments (Jensen 1986).6 Consequently, firms undertaking poor
investments and, more generally, poorly performing firms are more likely to be the
target of a (hostile) takeover bid.
These predictions are only partly supported by the available evidence. While stud-
ies on US and UK data consistently document that takeover targets are smaller than
other firms, only some report that hostile takeovers tend to be directed towards poorly
performing firms in troubled industries (e.g. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). Other
studies find no significant diﬀerence in pre-takeover performance between targets
and non-targets, or between targets of friendly and of hostile bids (e.g. Comment
and Schwert 1995; Martin and McConnell 1991; Franks and Mayer 1996). These results
suggest that the selection process in the market for corporate control relies more on
size than performance.
As for unprofitable investments by target firms, the evidence is also mixed. On the
one hand, takeover targets are more likely to have made poor acquisitions previously,
notably poor diversification acquisitions (Mitchell and Lehn 1990; Berger and Ofek
1996).7 These findings suggest that recouping equity value lost through poor acqui-
sitions is one source of takeover gains. In support of this interpretation, Allen et al.
(1995) document that a major source of gains from spin-oﬀs is the reversal of earlier
unwise acquisitions. On the other hand, large firms in the gas and oil industry apart,
5 Disciplinary takeovers are commonly associated with hostile bids, (initially) opposed by target board
and management. In contrast, friendly takeovers are viewed as motivated by synergies arising from
combining the firms’ assets (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). In practice, many takeovers contain
elements of both friendly and hostile bids. Indeed, Schwert 2000 finds hostile and friendly takeovers
to be indistinguishable in economic terms. He argues that the choice of hostile (friendly) oﬀer is largely a
reflection of the acquiring firm’s negotiation strategy.
6 According to Jensen 1988, 1993, the 1980s takeovers in the USA were caused by a failure of internal
governance mechanisms to bring about the restructuring required to meet the technological and regula-
tory changes.
7 Some recent studies (e.g. Campa and Kedia 2002), however, suggest that the diversification discount
is due to the diversifying firms being diﬀerent, rather than to diversification being value destroying.
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there is no systematic evidence that takeover targets overinvest in internally developed
projects or that capital expenditures change after the takeover (Servaes 1994; Healy,
Palepu, and Ruback 1992; Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990).
In summary, the empirical evidence lends only limited support to the notion that
takeovers are directed at underperforming firms or at firms with a poor investment
record.8 Even if takeovers may not be an eﬀective means to correct ineﬃciencies, they
may nonetheless create value by, for instance, exploiting synergies.
1.2. Takeover Gains
To assess the economic consequences of takeovers, a plethora of empirical studies
examines stock returns surrounding the announcement dates. These event studies
document unanimously that target shareholders gain substantially from takeovers.
For US takeovers, average abnormal returns for target shareholders are typically
found to be in the range of 15 to 30 per cent (Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord 2001;
Bruner 2002). The findings for the UK are similar to those for the USA (McCahery
et al. 2004), while target shareholder returns in continental European takeovers are
lower but still substantial at around 10 per cent (Goergen and Renneboog 2004;
Campa and Hernando 2004).
The evidence on acquiring firms’ shareholder return is far less conclusive. Some
studies report positive abnormal bidder returns (e.g. Goergen and Renneboog 2004;
Schwert 1996), others document negative bidder returns (e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and
Staﬀord 2001), and still others find no significant eﬀects (e.g. Stulz, Walkling, and
Song 1990). Whether positive or negative, bidder returns are small, ranging from +5
to −5 per cent.9 There is more consensus about the net shareholder wealth eﬀect
of takeovers. Most studies report that the combined average abnormal returns are
positive but relatively small ranging from 1 to 3 per cent (e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and
Staﬀord 2001; Campa and Hernando 2004).
Overall, the studies on announcement period stock returns suggest that takeovers
create gains to shareholders, but that these gains accrue (almost) entirely to target
shareholders.10 These gains are the evidence upon which Jensen (1988) among others
bases the claim that takeovers create value. The inference from observed stock price
8 Managerial turnover has been found to increase in target firms following the completion of the
takeover, particularly if the pre-takeover performance has been poor (e.g. Martin and McConnell 1991).
An inverse relation between forced CEO turnover and firm performance has also been documented for
firms that are not takeover targets (see the survey by Murphy 1999). This suggests that both internal and
external control mechanisms serve to monitor and discipline managers.
9 While many studies do not distinguish between (friendly) mergers and (hostile) tender oﬀers,
those that do tend to find higher target as well as bidder returns in hostile takeovers and tender oﬀers
than in friendly acquisitions and mergers (McCahery et al. 2004). In addition, target and/or acquiring
firms’ announcement returns are found to vary systematically with other characteristics, such as means
of payments (Travlos 1987), relatedness of bidder’s and target’s businesses (Comment and Jarrell 1995),
book-to-market value ratios (Rau and Vermaelen 1998).
10 One problem when interpreting stock returns is that takeover announcements also reveal infor-
mation about the stand-alone value of target and bidder firms. When correcting for the revelation bias,
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increases to eﬃciency improvements relies, however, on some stringent (implicit)
conditions, in particular informationally eﬃcient stock markets and the absence of
externalities and redistribution.
The eﬃcient market hypothesis has been challenged by long-run performance
studies documenting abnormal positive and negative stock returns following diﬀerent
corporate events, such as equity issues, stock splits, and acquisitions. These findings
suggest that investors systematically misjudge the impact of corporate events. Accord-
ingly, short-term announcement period returns are flawed measures of shareholder
wealth eﬀects of corporate events.11 In their review of the literature on long-run
stock returns following acquisitions, Agrawal and Jaﬀe (2000) argue that there is
evidence of abnormal underperformance in mergers but that share prices during
tender oﬀer announcements do not overestimate future gains. Compared to other
studies, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000) find smaller—often insignificant—abnormal
returns and less variation across subsamples of acquisitions, e.g. cash financed versus
stock financed. Overall, their study suggests that long-run abnormal stock returns
following acquisitions are limited to small acquiring firms.
Irrespective of how accurately positive abnormal stock returns during the an-
nouncement period reflect the long-run wealth eﬀects, documented shareholder
gains are merely suggestive of eﬃciency improvements. Event studies cannot reveal
the source of the shareholder gains. These gains may arise from the correction of mis-
management or from synergies or may stem from expropriation of target stakeholder
or from transfers at the expense of the acquiring firms’ shareholders.
Accounting data-based studies attempt to identify the source of gains by com-
paring firm performance before and after the takeover. If shareholder gains reflect
true value creation, improvements in operating performance should be the coun-
terpart of these gains. However, operating performance studies oﬀer conflicting ev-
idence.12 Some studies report improvements in operating cash flows of the com-
bined firms relative to their industry peers (e.g. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 1992)
and productivity improvement at the plant level (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1987, 1989).
Other studies do not find evidence of improved performance (e.g. McGuckin and
Nguyen 1995; Schoar 2002) or even document a post-takeover decline in the tar-
get’s performance compared to non-acquired comparable firms (e.g. Ravenscraft and
Scherer 1987).
When interpreting the diﬀerent findings, it should be borne in mind that poor
post-takeover performance does not necessarily imply value destruction. If indus-
try shocks are the source of takeovers, firms consolidating via takeovers should
not necessarily be expected to outperform a pre-shock benchmark (Mitchell and
Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny 2005 find larger combined abnormal returns than the returns found in earlier
studies using traditional announcement period estimation methods (e.g. Bradley, Desai, and Kim 1988).
11 This literature has itself come under attack from studies documenting the sensitivity of long-term
performance estimates to modifications of either the sample or the methodology. For a discussion of these
issues, see Fama 1998.
12 An exception are leveraged buyouts (LBOs) for which the available evidence documents improve-
ments in operating performance (Holmström and Kaplan 2001).
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Mulherin 1996). Nonetheless, the lack of clear evidence in support of performance
improvements is puzzling in view of the documented large (target) shareholder gains
and casts some doubt on the claim that takeovers create value. Indeed, it has been
contended that takeover premia reflect redistributive gains rather than eﬃciency
improvements.
Transfers from acquiring firms are one possible explanation for low returns to
their shareholders but high returns to target shareholders. Managers of acquiring
firms may overestimate their ability to improve the target firm’s operation and as
a result pay a too high acquisition price (Roll 1986). Alternatively, takeovers can be a
manifestation of the managers’ ability to pursue their own interest at the expense of
the shareholders. Such acquisitions serve the purpose of empire building (Marris 1963,
1964), diversification of the manager’s human capital risk (Amihud and Lev 1981), or
simply reflect the availability of excess cash (Jensen 1986).13
Empirical studies strongly suggest that managerial self-interest can trigger or
even drive takeovers, and that such acquisitions generate low if not negative returns
to acquiring shareholders. Previously discussed evidence in support of the notion
that takeovers can be a manifestation of agency problems within the acquiring firm
includes the mixed evidence on post-takeover performance, the high degree of
overlap between target and bidder firms, and the target firms’ poor record of past
acquisitions. Other findings also indicate that managerial self-interest matters for
takeovers. Bidding firms tend to have large amounts of free cash flow and relatively
low leverage, and firms with more excess cash are more likely to make acquisitions
with poor returns for their shareholders (Harford 1999; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling
1991; Bruner 1988). Furthermore, bidder returns are higher when managers of the
acquiring firm own larger shareholdings (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 1997; Lewellen,
Loderer, and Rosenfeld 1985). Thus, managerial motives appear to be an important
determinant of takeover activity. The positive combined shareholder returns reject,
however, the hypothesis that target shareholders gain purely at the expense of the
acquiring firm’s shareholders.
In an influential paper, Shleifer and Summers (1988) expound the concern that
takeovers can be a means to redistribute wealth from target stakeholders to share-
holders. They argue that bidders, notably in hostile bids, renege on existing contracts,
either explicit or implicit, and expropriate rents from the target stakeholders. Antic-
ipating this breach of contract, target shareholders demand higher prices from the
bidders, and thus the post-acquisition transfers show up as (part of) the takeover
premia. Potential victims of such redistributions are employees, creditors, consumers,
and the tax authorities.
The empirical evidence on transfers from stakeholders as the primary motivation
for takeovers is not convincing. Generally neither blue-collar lay-oﬀs nor wage cuts
are found to explain more than a small fraction of the takeover premium (Brown
and Medoﬀ 1988; Kaplan 1989a; Lichtenberg and Siegel 1989; Rosett 1993). In hostile
13 In Jensen’s (1986) view such acquisitions are the lesser of two evils. They involve less waste than
unprofitable internal projects and disgorge cash to investors if not purely made with shares (share
exchange oﬀers).
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takeovers cutbacks, disproportionately targeted at white-collar employees, are more
important and account for 11 to 26 per cent of the premium on average (Bhagat,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1990).14
Bondholders may be hurt by increased leverage in takeovers because of the higher
default risk. In addition, the higher level of debt may itself induce shareholders or
managers acting on their behalf to opt for riskier ventures, further increasing the
likelihood of a future bankruptcy (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Studies on leverage
buyouts document reductions in corporate bond prices during the announcement
period but these losses are very small relative to the shareholder gains (Marais,
Schipper, and Smith 1989; Warga and Welch 1993).15
As takeovers often involve firms in the same or closely related industries (Bhagat,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1990), shareholder gains may also reflect increased extraction
of consumer surplus. To test for market power, empirical studies examine the stock
market reaction of rival firms in response to takeover announcements. The underly-
ing idea is that an anti-competitive takeover raises product prices and thus benefits
all firms in the industry. Using this approach, Stillman (1983) and Eckbo (1983,
1985) reject the market power hypothesis. Later studies question the reliability of
the approach and find evidence of anti-competitive eﬀects (McAfee and Williams
1988; Mullin, Mullin, and Mullin 1995). While the evidence on market power is
not conclusive, transfers from consumers are most likely not an important eﬀect of
takeovers.
Takeovers can generate tax benefits through increased utilization of tax loss and
tax credit carry-forwards or through higher interest deductions associated higher
debt levels. The available evidence suggests that takeovers benefited from tax savings,
amounting in some cases to more than a quarter of the takeover premium (Bhagat,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1990). Although tax advantages are a source of takeover gains,16
they do not seem to be a major force behind the takeover activity.
In conclusion, empirical studies find that stakeholders indeed experience wealth
losses in takeovers. As major restructuring typically follows a takeover, such losses
are—to some extent—inevitable but have to be accounted for when assessing the
eﬃciency eﬀects of takeovers. On balance, stakeholder losses explain, however, only a
modest fraction of the total gains to shareholders, suggesting that eﬃciency improve-
ments clearly outweigh redistribution away from stakeholders.
14 Employees may also be harmed by reductions in pension provisions following a takeover. Empiri-
cally, pension reversions are neither a primary motivation for takeovers nor an important source of gains,
accounting for about 1% of the total premia (Ippolito and James 1992; Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; Pontiﬀ,
Shleifer, and Weisbach 1990).
15 Increased leverage may also strengthen the firm’s bargaining power as the associated higher bank-
ruptcy risk can force stakeholders, e.g. workers and suppliers, to make concessions to management and
shareholders (Perotti and Spier 1993). Brown, Fee, and Thomas 2005 document that suppliers experience
deteriorating stock market and operating performance when an important customer (accountable for
10% or more of the revenues) undergoes a LBO.
16 According to Kaplan 1989b, 1991, tax savings account for most of the premium in management
buyouts. These benefits are, however, significantly reduced by the rapid debt repayment.
09-Frexias-c09 OUP148-Freixas-et-al (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 273 of 297 July 4, 2007 10:46
takeovers 273
1.3. Takeover Threat
The market for corporate control has not only a profound impact on target and
acquiring firms but also on non-transacting firms. That is, the mere threat or pos-
sibility of a takeover can induce managers to alter their behaviour. Whether the
resulting eﬀects are primarily beneficial or detrimental is at least as controversial as
the eﬃciency eﬀects of actually completed takeovers. On the one hand, it is argued
that the takeover threat deters managers from pursuing their own interests at the
expense of the shareholders. For instance, the large-scale restructuring carried out by
incumbent managers during the 1980s is attributed to the concurrent real takeover
threat (Holmström and Kaplan 2001).
On the other hand, it is contended that the takeover threat may induce managers to
distort their behaviour rather than promote profit-maximizing actions. First, incum-
bent managers can use anti-takeover measures, like poison pills, stock repurchases, or
litigation, to fend oﬀ hostile takeovers.17 Furthermore, if takeovers are undertaken for
reasons other than reversing ineﬃciencies, acting in the shareholders’ best interest
need not be an eﬀective protection against a takeover. In fact, the above evidence
that size consistently reduces the takeover probability (and more so than good per-
formance) implies that growth rather than eﬃciency is a viable defence strategy.
Alternatively, managers may entrench themselves by tailoring the firm’s operations
more to their own abilities to become less easily replaceable, even though this course
of action reduces firm value (Shleifer and Vishny 1989).
Second, the possibility of losing the job may discourage managers from investing
in firm-specific human capital. More generally, if takeovers imply some form of
contract renegotiation the firm’s stakeholders are reluctant to undertake firm-specific
investments, thereby reducing ex ante eﬃciencies (Shleifer and Summers 1988).
Finally, the takeover pressure may induce managers to sacrifice long-term prof-
itability to boost short-term earnings (Stein 1988). Moreover, such short-termism
may be in the shareholders’ best interest. For example, suppose that the manager has
superior information about the value of the firm, and that the sale of an asset is the
only way to credibly convey the actual value to uninformed shareholders. Although
this short-term action is costly, i.e. the sold asset is worth less outside the company, it
is a best response to an imminent takeover. The loss incurred through costly signalling
is more than oﬀset by the takeover returns, as it prevents the bidder from acquiring
the firm at too low a price. More generally, a takeover threat may hinder firms from
pursuing profitable long-term strategies, such as investment in R&D.
To assess the impact of the takeover threat, empirical studies examine the eﬀects
that firm-specific takeover defences and anti-takeover legislation have on stock re-
turns, firm performance, and operating decisions. The conflicting views on this topic
may be summarized by two hypotheses. The entrenchment hypothesis holds that
anti-takeover provisions are detrimental: they raise the cost of a takeover and hence
17 By the end of the 1980s, most S&P 500 firms and a vast majority of those firms listed on the
NYSE or Amex were covered by several anti-takeover devices, ranging from poison pills, supermajority
amendments, to state anti-takeover laws (Danielson and Karpoﬀ 1998).
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reduce the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control. This hinders an
eﬃcient redeployment of corporate assets and allows managers to pursue their own
interests to a larger extent. As a result, firms covered by defensive devices are less
eﬃcient and their value is correspondingly lower.18 Under the shareholder interest
hypothesis, defensive devices allow for more eﬃcient contracting with the manager,
thereby encouraging firm-specific human capital investment (Knoeber 1986), prevent
coercive bids (Bebchuk and Hart 2001), make the manager a tougher negotiator in the
takeover (Harris 1990),19 and promote competition among bidders once the company
has come into play (Shleifer and Vishny 1986a). Moreover, defensive devices protect
managers (and firms) from the disruptive eﬀects of takeovers, enabling them to focus
on long-term profitable strategies.
The shareholder wealth eﬀects of firm-specific takeover defences are examined in
numerous studies, surveyed by Coates (2000) and Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin
(2003: chapter 19). Early studies (e.g. Malatesta and Walkling 1988; Ryngaert 1988)
tend to find that the adoption of takeover defences is associated with small negative
abnormal returns of less than 1 per cent. However, later studies (e.g. Comment and
Schwert 1995; Heron and Lie 2006) report insignificant average stock price reactions
but higher takeover premia. This suggests that takeover defences strengthen the target
firms’ bargaining position without preventing many takeovers. Overall, the evidence
is mixed, ranging from small negative to non-existent abnormal stock returns, and
diﬃcult to interpret because the adoption of a takeover defence may simultaneously
signal that management expects a takeover bid.20
Several studies attempt to determine the impact of anti-takeover statutes on
stock returns. By and large, these studies find abnormal negative stock returns
(e.g. Szewczyk and Tsetsekos 1992; Karpoﬀ and Malatesta 1989; Ryngaert and Netter
1988), though some report no significant eﬀects (e.g. Margotta, McWilliams, and
McWilliams 1990; Pugh and Jahera 1990).21 Overall, the studies appear to favour
the entrenchment hypothesis, though some caution seems in place also because the
diﬀerent states’ anti-takeover statutes vary in the extent to which they are a deterrent
to would-be acquiring firms (Daines and Klausner 2001).
18 In this view, the widespread use of takeover defences and the increase in anti-takeover legislation
are one of the reasons both for the ending of the 1980s takeover wave and for the paucity of hostile bids
during the 1990s takeover wave (Holmström and Kaplan 2001).
19 Takeover defences can also resolve information problems to the benefit of target shareholders (Sarig
and Talmor 1997) and to the benefit of both target shareholders and acquiring firms (Hirschleifer and
Titman 1990).
20 Claessens et al. 2002 and Gompers, Ishii, and metrich 2003 among others document that firms with
good corporate governance, as measured by various proxies, earn significantly higher returns and are
more highly valued over a long horizon. These results suggest that anti-takeover devices, being a reflection
of poor governance, have an adverse impact on firm performance. However, the results may also reflect
changes in the business environment not directly related to firm governance (Becht, Bolton, and Röell
2003).
21 Compared to firm-specific takeover defence studies, these studies avoid problems of mixed signals
and selection bias. Their main diﬃcult is to choose, i.e. assume, the date at which the market became
aware of a new anti-takeover statute and impounded the eﬀect into the stock prices (Bertrand and
Mullainathan 2003).
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A smaller body of work examines the eﬀects of firm-specific takeover defences
and anti-takeover legislation on firm performance and managerial decisions. The
adoption of firm-specific takeover defences is found to be associated either with no
subsequent decline in firm performance (Johnson and Rao 1997) or with a subsequent
improvement (Field and Karpoﬀ 2002; Danielson and Karpoﬀ 2006). In contrast,
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) report that total factor productivity declines in
firms after they are covered by anti-takeover laws. Moreover, anti-takeover statutes
lead to fewer new investments and fewer disinvestments. This result suggests that
managers, shielded from the takeover threat, do not behave like empire builders, but
tend to become sluggish. Garvey and Hanka (1999) document that firms protected by
anti-takeover laws substantially reduce their leverage. This suggests that legal barriers
to takeovers increase financial slack.
The evidence on the argument that the takeover threat causes managers to behave
myopically is scarce and divided.22 Meulbroek et al. (1990) find a decrease in R&D
expenditures following the adoption of firm-level takeover defences. Using a broader
measure of R&D expenditure, Pugh, Page, and Jahera (1992) present contrary results,
consistent with the notion that the takeover threat forces managers to sacrifice long-
term investments.
Finally, managers of firms that adopt takeover defences (Borokhovich, Brunarski,
and Parrino 1997) or are covered by anti-takeover laws (Bertrand and Mullainathan
1998) receive higher salaries. These findings are consistent with the view that takeover
defences increase agency costs (entrenchment hypothesis). Wage increases following
the introduction of anti-takeover statutes are not restricted to CEOs. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (1999) find that anti-takeover laws raise annual wages by 1 to 2 per cent.
As the associated increase in the total wage bill exceeds the negative share price reac-
tion to these laws, the wage increase does not represent pure transfers but also leads to
higher profits. This is consistent with the view that a reduced takeover risk encourages
valuable firm-specific human capital investment (Shleifer and Summers 1988).
In sum, the evidence on the eﬀects of anti-takeover devices is too inconclusive
to draw general or strong conclusions. In particular, the results are not suﬃciently
strong to infer that anti-takeover devices necessarily harm shareholders and degrade
firm performance. They seem to be associated with higher takeover premia and in
some cases with benefits that exceed the loss in share value.
When debating the eﬀects of defensive measures it is important to distinguish
between the impact of defensive measures and the power to undertake them. The
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders is particularly pronounced
in takeovers: managerial turnover increases significantly following the completion of
a takeover, and those managers who lose their jobs do not easily find another senior
executive position (Martin and McConnell 1991; Agrawal and Walkling 1994). Hence,
22 Share prices are found to react positively (negatively) to the announcement of an increase (decrease)
in investment expenditures (McConnell and Muscarella 1985). This finding is inconsistent with the view
that the stock market has a myopic time horizon. It is, however, also compatible with managers acting
myopically (Stein 1988). If managers are reluctant to invest, the present value of those few projects that
they undertake is very high, and the market should hence react positively to the announcement of such
investments.
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if a manager can apply defences without shareholder ratification, he may abuse this
discretion. Indeed, managers seem less inclined to resist when they gain financially
more from a successful bid (Cotter and Zenner 1994; Song and Walkling 1993). Con-
sequently, shareholders need to supervise the manager’s defensive actions closely, and
to facilitate this task, defensive measures should be subject to shareholder ratification.
2. Tender Offer Process
.............................................................................................................................................
In addition to takeovers being motivated by value improvements, the tenet of an
eﬃcient market for corporate control relies on the assumption that a party who can
improve the firm’s market value finds it profitable to launch a takeover and succeeds
in doing so. High transaction costs which are involved in takeovers particularly of
large firms are one reason why the allocation of control may not be eﬃcient. Another
related reason concerns the division of takeover gains between target and acquiring
firms. Indeed, if the acquiring firm appropriates too small a fraction of the surplus
to cover its costs, it does not make a bid, even if the takeover were to create value.
Grossman and Hart (1980b) and Bradley (1980) argue that such an unequal distrib-
ution of takeover gains is not simply a remote possibility but inherent to the tender
oﬀer process. Their argument therefore oﬀers a rationale for why—as recounted in
the previous section—nearly all the takeover gains accrue to the target shareholders.
Ultimately, this implies that managers who are either ineﬃcient or pursue self-serving
actions need not be vulnerable to a takeover bid. Subsequently, we review the analysis
of Grossman and Hart (1980b) as it is central to the understanding of the tender oﬀer
process and represents—to the current day—the point of reference for many issues
in the takeover debate.
2.1. Free-rider Problem
Grossman and Hart (1980b) consider a firm with a completely dispersed ownership
that is approached by an outside buyer, henceforth the rival. Let X I denote the firm’s
stock market value under the incumbent management and X R its market value under
the rival’s control. The corresponding per-share values are xI and xR respectively,
where by assumption xR > xI .23 That is, we restrict attention here to the commonly
considered case of a value-increasing takeover.
To gain control, a rival has to win the approval of a majority of shareholders and
to outbid any competing oﬀer.24 To focus on the target shareholders’ impact on the
23 For simplicity, we also assume that the current share price is not forward-looking, i.e. does not
incorporate the possibility of a takeover, but is equal to xI . The qualitative arguments would not change
if we were to include the impact that the prospect of a takeover has on the current share price.
24 To succeed an oﬀer also has to overcome managerial resistance. However, as tender oﬀers are directly
addressed to shareholders, incumbent managers cannot unilaterally discard a tender oﬀer once it is made.
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tender oﬀer outcome, we abstract for the time being from competition by another
would-be acquirer and discuss it later. Hence, the rival gains control if he succeeds
in inducing shareholders to tender at least 50 per cent of the shares. (All shares carry
the same number of votes.) To this end, the rival makes an unrestricted tender oﬀer
with a price p for each share, conditional on getting (at least) 50 per cent of the
shares. The rival does not own any shares prior to the bid and incurs a takeover
cost C > 0. Shareholders do not coordinate their response to the oﬀer, but decide
non-cooperatively and simultaneously whether to tender their shares. Given the large
(infinite) number of shareholders, each of them rightly presumes that his decision
does not aﬀect the tender oﬀer outcome. For simplicity, firm (share) values X I and
X R (xI and xR) and the takeover cost Care known to all parties.
When deciding whether or not to accept the oﬀer, each shareholder compares the
benefits and costs of tendering in case of success and failure of the takeover. If less
than 50 per cent of the shares are tendered, the oﬀer is void, and each individual
shareholder’s decision is immaterial. Incumbent management remains in control
and the share value is xI . If the oﬀer succeeds, a shareholder receives the oﬀered
price p when tendering and the post-takeover share value xR when retaining his
share. Consequently, he prefers to retain his share for any price p below xR . As all
shareholders behave in the same manner, the lowest price at which the rival can
succeed is p = xR . At this price the rival not only makes no profit but incurs a loss
due to the takeover cost C .25
Thus, we have replicated the seemingly paradoxical result of Grossman and Hart
(1980b): A value-increasing takeover of a completely dispersed firm cannot succeed
because of the small shareholders’ free-riding behaviour. The success of the takeover
is a public good, but each individual shareholder prefers to hold out to extract the
maximum gain. As a result, the rival cannot appropriate any fraction of the value
improvement and has therefore no incentives to undertake the takeover in the first
place.26 That is, there are too few takeovers.
2.2. Acquirer Gains
The theoretical literature on takeovers suggests several ways how the free-rider prob-
lem may be overcome. Common to all the diﬀerent proposals is that they increase the
share of the gains appropriated by the rival and consequently reduce that of the target
Nonetheless, incumbent managers can resort to various defensive tactics to influence the shareholders’
perception of an oﬀer, to solicit a competing oﬀer, or even to deter a bid in the first place. Some of these
defensive tactics and their likely eﬀects have been discussed in the previous section.
25 This result is independent of the value improvement xR − xI that the rival can realize. Moreover,
even if shareholders do not know the post-takeover share value xR , they can anticipate that it must exceed
the oﬀered price because the bidder would otherwise make a loss.
26 With a finite rather than infinite number of shareholders, each individual shareholder takes into
account that his decision is with positive probability pivotal for the aggregate outcome. Hence, he is
willing to tender at a price (slightly) below the post-takeover share value, leaving the bidder some profits
(Bagnoli and Lipman 1988; Holmström and Nalebuﬀ 1992). In support of this prediction, acquirers
of unlisted firms earn positive abnormal announcement returns (Faccio, MaConnell, and Stolin 2005;
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004).
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shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1980b) propose to allow the rival to withhold part
of the proceeds from the minority shareholders. Dilution creates a wedge between the
post-takeover share value to the rival and that to minority shareholders, enabling the
rival to make a profit. More specifically, suppose that the rival can divert a fraction
ˆ ∈ (0, 1) of the proceeds VR generated under his control as private benefits BR .
For instance, the rival could pay minority shareholders only (1 − f ) of the divi-
dends that he collects.27 Consequently, investors price the share after the takeover at
xR = (1 − f )vR , and each shareholder is willing to tender at a price p = xR . Provided
that the private benefits are suﬃcient to cover the takeover cost ( f VR > C ), the rival
finds it profitable to undertake the bid.28
The proposal of Grossman and Hart (1980b) makes the fundamental trade-oﬀ
between promoting takeovers and protecting minority shareholder interests very
transparent. To the extent that (target) shareholder protection amounts to granting
them a substantial share of the gains, it necessarily discourages would-be acquirers.
Hence, an active takeover market relies on ceding acquirers benefits that do not accrue
to other shareholders on a pro rata basis. As a corollary, it follows that maximum
shareholder protection need not be in the shareholders’ best interest. Banning all
extraction, i.e. imposing ˆ = 0, prevents the rival from making a profit, thereby
frustrating takeovers. This is also costly for the target shareholders, as they forgo the
takeover premium.
A closely related point is that minority protection aimed at restricting the dilution
of minority shares does not serve as a screening device (Berglöf and Burkart 2003).
Better minority protection does not frustrate those bids where the acquirer is the
primary recipient of the takeover gains without discouraging even more those bids
where the gains are more evenly shared.
Another way to overcome the free-rider problem is to finance the takeover with
debt, backed by the assets of the target firm (Mueller and Panunzi 2004). Since debt
is senior to equity, leverage reduces the post-takeover share value. Thus, loading debt
on the target reduces the bid price, while the acquirer receives (part of) the proceeds
from the debt issue.
Yet another way to exclude target shareholders from part of the takeover gains is
to grant successful acquirers a squeeze-out right, i.e. the right to compel remain-
ing minority shareholders to sell their shares (Yarrow 1985; Amihud, Kahan, and
27 Discriminatory dividends are merely an illustrative example of private benefit extraction that should
not be taken literally. While the law in most countries forbids overt minority shareholder expropriation,
there are various more subtle forms that are either diﬃcult to prove in court, or even not against the letter
of the law. For instance, the rival can sell at below market prices output or assets of the target firm to
another firm under his control. Other forms of dilution are investment in unprofitable ventures (empire
building), excessive salaries to the executive, the consumption of perks, and the appointment of friends
or family members to management positions.
28 Bid price and shareholder wealth do not depend on whether the bid is unrestricted or restricted
(to 50%). In either case, the rival oﬀers a price equal to the post-takeover minority share value, and the
shareholders neither gain nor lose from tendering their shares.
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Sundaram 2004).29 When an oﬀer conditional upon acceptance of the freeze-out
fraction succeeds, the rival has the option to squeeze out the remaining minority
shareholders. As a result, these shareholders realize at most a return equal to the bid
price p and therefore may as well accept the oﬀer. This holds true also for bid prices
below the post-takeover share value ( p < xR). That is, a takeover conditioned on the
squeeze-out threshold prevents shareholders from becoming minority shareholders,
thereby solving the free-rider problem.
Direct dilution of minority shareholder rights, debt financing, and the squeeze-
out rule all solve or mitigate the free-rider problem by reducing the post-takeover
share value. Another somewhat distinct solution is the acquisition of a stake prior to
the tender oﬀer (Shleifer and Vishny 1986b; Chowdhry and Jegadeesh 1994). Suppose
the rival already owns a stake in the target firm before mounting the tender oﬀer.
Even if the rival cannot dilute minority shareholder rights and has to oﬀer the full
post-takeover value ( p = vR), the takeover may be profitable. While the rival makes
zero profit on the shares acquired in the tender oﬀer, he captures (some of ) the
value improvement of his initial stake, provided the pre-takeover price of the stake is
relatively low.30 This argument shows that the possibility to (secretly) acquire shares
prior to the oﬀer is an important source of acquirers’ profit. Indeed, pre-takeover
holdings are found to have a positive impact on bidder gains and on the success
probability of takeovers (Stulz, Walkling, and Song 1990; Choi 1991).31
The ease and extent to which an acquirer can accumulate an initial stake through
secret open market purchases depend on the market depth and the disclosure require-
ment. Once an acquirer has to disclose his identity and holdings, further open market
purchases become increasingly less attractive. As disclosure requirements limit the
numbers of shares that an acquirer can secretly accumulate prior to a bid, they aﬀect
the division of takeover gains. Loose disclosure standards allocate a larger share of
the takeover gains to the bidder, thereby promoting takeovers market. This, however,
comes at the expense of those shareholders that sold their shares prior to the bid,
thereby forgoing the takeover premium.
These extensions and modifications of the Grossman and Hart (1980b) model show
that takeovers of widely held firms can be profitable. They do not, however, alter the
basic insight that the free-rider behaviour prevents an acquirer from making a profit
on those shares that he purchases in the tender oﬀer. This holds true irrespective
of the extent to which (and the ploy with which) the acquirer excludes minority
29 The European Takeover Directive (Article 14) introduces the squeeze-out right with a threshold of
90% of the equity capital, but grants member states the discretion to apply in some circumstances a higher
threshold with an upper limit of 95%.
30 Kyle and Vila 1991 show that noise trading allows the bidder to acquire an initial stake at favourable
prices so that the takeover becomes profitable. Complementing this result, Cornelli and Li 2002 demon-
strate that trading by risk arbitrageurs in the post-announcement market facilitates takeovers of firms
with an initially dispersed ownership.
31 Goldman and Qian 2005 argue that while owning a larger initial stake increases the acquirer’s profit
if the tender oﬀer succeeds, it also increases the loss if the oﬀer fails. Consequently, acquirers may prefer
to accumulate less than the maximum legally allowed pre-takeover stake, as documented by empirical
studies (e.g. Betton and Eckbo 2000; Jennings and Mazzeo 1993).
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shareholders from the takeover gains. Once the acquirer has control and extracts
private benefits f VR , he values the shares (not needed for having control) at xR =
(1 − f )vR , the price that he has to oﬀer the shareholders. The large takeover premia
seem to suggest that the possibilities to expropriate target shareholders are—at least
in advanced market economies—limited. Hence, the acquirers’ profit prospects are
small and too few value-increasing takeovers occur as posited by Grossman and Hart
(1980b).
Closely related to the failure of value-increasing bids is another—diametrically
opposed—ineﬃciency, namely the success of value-decreasing bids. To assess this
possibility, we replicate the above analysis with the assumption of a value-decreasing
rival (xR < xI ). Anticipating failure, each shareholder is indiﬀerent between ten-
dering and retaining and may as well retain his shares. Hence, failure of a value-
decreasing bid is an equilibrium outcome. However, anticipating success, each share-
holder prefers to tender if the rival oﬀers at least the post-takeover share value. Thus,
success of a value-decreasing bid (marginally) above the post-takeover share value
(xI > p > xR) is also an equilibrium outcome, even though it is against the collective
interest of the shareholders. Confronted with such a bid, shareholders face a pressure-
to-tender problem (Bebchuk 1988). Tendering becomes individually rational to avoid
being in a less favourable minority position ( p > xR). As for the rival, he obviously
attempts such a bid only if its success entails substantial private benefits. While
success of a value-decreasing bid is an equilibrium outcome of the takeover game,
its empirical relevance seems questionable in view of the consistently documented
large gains to target shareholders.
As noted in the literature (e.g. Bebchuk and Hart 2001), the success of a value-
decreasing bid has the same cause as the failure of a value-increasing bid: each
shareholder bases his tendering decision only on a comparison between bid price
p and post-takeover share value xR , without taking the pre-takeover share value xI
into account. As a result, a shareholder retains his shares even though he prefers the
bid to succeed (free-rider problem) or he tenders his shares even though he prefers
the bid to fail (pressure-to-tender problem).32
A diﬀerent limitation of the takeover mechanism is identified by Burkart, Gromb,
and Panunzi (1998) who examine the implications of the post-takeover incentive
problems on the part of the successful acquirer. As for the dilution of shareholder
rights, the discussion so far implicitly assumed that the extraction of private benefits
is eﬃcient, that is, each dollar withheld from the shareholders yields one dollar of
private benefit. By contrast, Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998) assume that such
extraction is ineﬃcient and exhibits decreasing marginal returns. As the rival owns
more shares, he internalizes more of this ineﬃciency and therefore extracts fewer
private benefits, which implies a higher post-takeover share value. Thus, private
benefit extraction with a convex deadweight loss is but one way of formalizing the
32 Both problems can be resolved by making target shareholder approval by a majority vote a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for an oﬀer to be accepted (Bebchuk and Hart 2001). The pressure-to-tender
problem is also removed by a mechanism that requires approval by majority vote and (at least) a majority
of shares tendered separately, such as a sell-out right with a 50% threshold (Burkart and Panunzi 2004).
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alignment eﬀect: A corporate insider with a larger equity stake is more prone to act
in the (outside) shareholders’ interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
As in Grossman and Hart (1980b), target shareholders do not tender unless the
bid price matches the post-takeover minority share value. The free-rider behaviour
has two consequences. First, the equilibrium supply of shares is increasing in the bid
price. Since the post-takeover share value increases in the acquirer’s final holding, the
number of shares tendered has to increase with the price to preserve that the post-
takeover share value equals the bid price. Second, the rival cannot make any profit on
the tendered shares, and the private benefits constitute his only profit. As a result, the
rival takes control by purchasing as few shares as necessary, i.e. 50 per cent, thereby
maintaining high incentives to extract private benefits. From a social point of view,
the ownership structure is not suﬃciently concentrated as private benefit extraction
entails a deadweight loss. However, the socially eﬃcient ownership concentration is
not feasible because the rival makes no profit if he acquires all the shares.
3. Share Blocks and Control Transfers
.............................................................................................................................................
The preceding analysis of the tender oﬀer process presumes target firms with dis-
persed ownership. Yet, companies with diﬀuse ownership are infrequent. Outside the
UK and USA, widely dispersed ownership, even among the largest corporations, is
not the prevalent organizational form (e.g. Denis and McConnell 2003; Barca and
Becht 2001; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999). But even in the USA
and the UK where publicly traded corporations stand out as having a more widely
dispersed ownership, many listed firms have a shareholder owning 5 to 10 per cent
(Gadhoum, Lang, and Young 2005; Holderness 2005).
The free-rider problem, caused by dispersed ownership, and its solution by means
of a pre-bid stake may suggest that the presence of a blockholder facilitates a takeover.
Instead of accumulating an initial stake through open market purchases, an acquirer
can negotiate a block sale with its current owner. While the blockholder may capture
some of the subsequent gains, the block trade enables the acquirer to purchase shares
below their post-takeover value, making a bid more (likely to be) profitable. More-
over, if the share block is suﬃciently large, the acquirer can gain (de facto) control
through a block trade, circumventing the free-rider problem altogether.33 However,
casual observations seem to defy this conjecture. The volume of takeover activity in
the UK and especially the USA has been much higher than in other countries. In fact,
the low level of takeover activity in these countries is commonly attributed to the
predominance of concentrated ownership structures, often enhanced with dual class
33 Control over a firm does not necessarily require a majority of the shares (votes), in particular, when
the remaining shares are dispersed.
09-Frexias-c09 OUP148-Freixas-et-al (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 282 of 297 July 4, 2007 10:46
282 mike burkart and fausto panunzi
shares, pyramiding, or cross-holdings.34 Thus, while blockholders have the ability to
promote a takeover by either selling or tendering their shares, they also have the power
to impede or block it, and experience indicates that the latter outcome prevails.
When comparing cross-country takeover activity, it should, however, be noted that
blocks may be traded without a full-scale takeover occurring. Indeed, an active market
for large share blocks is documented for European countries, such as Belgium, France,
Germany, and the UK (e.g. Dherment-Ferere, Köke, and Renneboog 2001; Goergen
and Renneboog 2000). Moreover, block sales tend to be related to poor past perfor-
mance and followed by increased management turnover (Köke 2001; Franks, Mayer,
and Renneboog 2002). Subsequently, we discuss how the presence of a blockholder
aﬀects the incidence and eﬃciency of control transfers.
3.1. Sales of Controlling Blocks
Obviously, a blockholder’s influence over the control allocation increases with the
block size, or more precisely, with the number of votes. If the incumbent blockholder
holds a majority of the votes—the associated fraction of shares can be (substantially)
smaller due to a dual class share structure—a control transfer can only take place
with his consent. As shown by Kahan (1993) and Bebchuk (1994), the incidence and
eﬃciency of majority block transactions depend on the regulatory regime as regards
the obligation to buy out minority shareholders. If the rival is not obliged to let the
minority shareholders participate in the control transaction, he can simply buy the
majority block at any price the incumbent blockholder is willing to sell. Consequently,
a control transfer takes place when the controlling block has a higher value under
the rival’s than under the incumbent’s control. How incumbent and rival split this
surplus determines the block price. Having purchased the controlling block, the rival
has always the option to buy out the minority shareholders. However, the rival cannot
gain from making a voluntary tender oﬀer because the small shareholders do not sell
unless the price equals the share value under the rival’s control.
Since the value of the controlling block comprises all the private benefits but only
part of the firm’s market (share) value, a surplus from a block trade does not imply
eﬃciency nor does eﬃciency imply a surplus. In particular, when the incumbent’s
private benefits are relatively small compared to the rival’s private benefits, a control
transfer can be mutually beneficial even if the loss in share value exceeds the increase
in private benefits. Conversely, when the rival’s private benefits are relatively small
compared to the incumbent’s private benefits, incumbent and rival may not want to
trade the block even though a control transfer would add value.
Under the mandatory bid rule as formulated in, for example, the European
Takeover Directive (Article 5), the rival cannot purchase the controlling block without
oﬀering all small shareholders the same per-share considerations. In such a regime, a
34 Takeover barriers other than concentrated ownership and takeover defences include close bank–
firm relationships, codetermination and the relatively small number of listed firms. For a brief discussion
see Berglöf and Burkart 2003.
09-Frexias-c09 OUP148-Freixas-et-al (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 283 of 297 July 4, 2007 10:46
takeovers 283
control transfers takes place if, as before, it is beneficial to the rival and the incumbent,
and if the rival earns a profit when having to oﬀer small shareholders the same
per-share price. These two conditions imply a total acquisition price above the total
firm value under the incumbent’s control, including his private benefits. Hence, the
mandatory bid rule prevents ineﬃcient control transfers. However, it also makes it
more likely that an eﬃcient control transfer is frustrated.35 The obligation to oﬀer all
shareholders the same per-share price may increase the total acquisition price beyond
the rival’s willingness to pay, even though a control transfer would be eﬃcient. Thus,
the mandatory bid rule can also be to the disadvantage of the small shareholders
since they may forgo share value improvements. Furthermore, the impact of the
mandatory bid rule is also sensitive to changes in the (assumed) setting (Burkart and
Panunzi 2004). For instance, if the private benefits of the incumbent and rival are of
the same order of magnitude, it is impossible that a block trade generates a surplus
but the control transfer is ineﬃcient. Thus, the mandatory bid rule loses in this case
its beneficial eﬀect of preventing ineﬃcient control transfers.
Empirical studies on block trades in the USA find that such trades are on average
associated with abnormal share price increases. Moreover, the abnormal returns are
smaller, but still positive, when no subsequent takeover occurs (Holderness 2003).
This evidence suggests that improved management rather than extraction of private
benefits is the primary source of gains in block trades. Studies on block trades
in other countries find the share price reaction to be positive or insignificant and
to vary with the identity of the buyer (e.g. Banerjee, Benoit, and Vermaelen 1997;
Trojanowski 2002). Overall, the evidence does not support the claim that block trades
are primarily undertaken with the purpose of looting companies at the expense of
small shareholders.
If a large shareholder does not own a majority block, a would-be acquirer does
not have to seek his consent to take over the firm. That is, control is contestable.
Confronted with a takeover attempt, a minority blockholder can respond in diﬀerent
ways. He may choose to compete with the rival, negotiate a block sale, accept or
reject the rival’s tender oﬀer. The possible responses are distinct, and accordingly the
presence of a minority blockholder can have diverse eﬀects on the takeover outcome,
as the following discussion shows.
3.2. Bidding Competition
Obviously, a bidding contest does not only emerge in the presence of a minority
blockholder but can just as likely take place between two outside parties, neither of
whom owns an initial stake. Most research on bidding competition considers this
latter case and abstracts from the free-rider problem. Instead, it is assumed that the
target accepts the highest bid, provided it oﬀers a premium relative to the current
35 Both eﬀects are diluted by less stringent versions of the mandatory bid rule. If some discrimination
between the per-share price in the block trade and the subsequent tender oﬀer is allowed, fewer eﬃcient
control transfers are frustrated and some ineﬃcient transfers are not prevented.
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market value.36 The bidding contest which yields the winning oﬀer is commonly
modelled as an English auction. In simple versions, bidders make oﬀers and counter-
oﬀers at no cost, each oﬀer incrementally higher than the previous, until the bidder
with the highest valuation wins at a price equal to the valuation of the second highest
bidder. Thus, competition leads to an eﬃcient control allocation. It also benefits tar-
get shareholders as bids and counter-bids drive up the price that the winner (highest
valuation bidder) has to pay. Empirical evidence shows that target shareholders earn
higher returns in multiple bidder contests (e.g. Bradley, Desai, and Kim 1988; Franks
and Harris 1989; Stulz, Walkling, and Song 1990).
In the English auction analysis, an initial bidder should bid low until competitors
arrive in which case each bidder should increase the previous bid only by a small
increment. The strategies provide, however, a poor description of actual takeover
contests in which initial bidders typically oﬀer a substantial premium and each
successive bid entails a sizeable increase over the last preceding bid. These patterns
obtain in richer frameworks where bidders have to incur costs to revise their bids or
to learn their (private) valuation of the target. In models with costly bid revision or
costly investigation, large bid increases and high initial bids signal a high willingness
to pay and may therefore induce other bidders to quit the contest or not to enter
(e.g. Fishman 1988). Such pre-emptive bids reduce eﬃciency and expected target
shareholder wealth because a bidder other than the highest valuation bidder can take
over the target at a price below the valuation of the second highest bidder.37 High
initial oﬀers are found to be associated with a lower likelihood of competing oﬀers
(Jennings and Mazzeo 1993).
Ineﬃcient bidding outcomes can also be caused by the firm’s security-voting struc-
ture, or more specifically, by deviations from the one share/one vote rule (Grossman
and Hart 1988; Harris and Raviv 1988). When a firm has several classes of shares,
bidding competition can lead to the same distortions as majority block trades. The
value of control to a bidder—like the value of a majority block—comprises all the
private benefits but only part of the firm’s market value. Hence, the bidder with
the larger private benefits may win the takeover contest instead of the bidder under
whose control total firm value is highest. By contrast, the one share/one vote rule
gives equal weight to private benefits and to the firm’s market value in determining
each bidder’s willingness to pay. Accordingly, the bidder under whose control total
firm value is highest is always able to outbid any competitor, ensuring an eﬃcient
control allocation. By contrast, deviation from the one share/one vote rule can
benefit target shareholders because it may intensify competition, thereby allowing
them to extract a larger share of the winning bidder’s private benefits. However,
such a surplus extraction strategy runs the risk of an ineﬃcient control allocation in
36 Eﬀective competition among rivals by definition implies that the requirement to outbid, rather than
winning shareholder approval, determines the bid price. Hence, ruling out the free-rider problem should
be viewed as a simplification rather than a restrictive assumption.
37 For an extensive discussion of multi-bidder models see Spatt 1989 and Hirshleifer 1995.
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which case target shareholders are also worse oﬀ than under the one share/one vote
rule.38
As for the role of minority blockholders in bidding contests, their stake gives them
an advantage over would-be competitors as they need to acquire fewer shares to attain
majority control (Dewatripont 1993; Ravid and Spiegel 1999). Moreover, a bidder
with an initial stake has an incentive to bid more aggressively, in fact, to bid more
than his valuation of the target firm (Burkart 1995; Singh 1998). Such overbidding
aims at provoking a counter-bid, and thereby increasing the returns when losing the
bidding contest. However, the bidder may actually win the contest, instead of merely
improving the selling price. In this case, the takeover outcome may be ineﬃcient and
the winning bidder (with an initial stake) may make a loss. Thus, overbidding brought
about by initial stakes provides an explanation why acquirers sometimes overpay that
is consistent with profit-maximizing behaviour.
Initial stakes may not only distort the outcome of bidding contests, but can also
prevent them. Overbidding reduces the expected gains for a potential competitor as
he has to pay a higher price when winning. As a result, he may be deterred from
incurring the costs to participate in the contest. Compared to the private value setting,
the deterrence eﬀect is amplified in the common value auction framework because
overbidding exacerbates the winner’s curse problem for the competitor, inducing him
to bid more conservatively (Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer 1999). Empirical studies
document that initial stakes are on average larger in single-bidder takeovers than in
multi-bidder contests (Stulz, Walkling, and Song 1990; Betton and Eckbo 2000).
As bids and counter-bids drive up the tender price, takeover contests undoubtedly
benefit target shareholders and on the whole also improve eﬃciency, notwithstanding
the distortions inherent in the bidding process. By contrast, competition is unde-
sirable from the bidders’ perspective; they may come away empty-handed, have to
pay a higher price to acquire the target, or—in case of minority blockholders—
have to increase their holdings to defeat an attempted takeover by another bidder.
Interestingly, even if a large minority blockholder is outbid by a rival and sells his
block, the takeover contest may not be in his best interest (Burkart, Gromb, and
Panunzi 2000). Instead of engaging the rival in a bidding contest, the blockholder
can (reluctantly) hand over control in a private block trade.39 When private benefit
extraction is ineﬃcient, the crucial diﬀerence between these two transaction modes
concerns the fraction of shares that the rival ultimately owns. The block trade pre-
serves the low ownership concentration, inducing more private benefit extraction. In
contrast, the competitive pressure in the tender oﬀer forces the rival to make a bid
that leads to more shares being tendered. As a result, the rival owns a larger fraction
of the shares and therefore diverts fewer private benefits. Although total firm value is
38 Field and Karpoﬀ 2002 document that over 5% of the 1,019 industrial firms that went public in the
USA between 1988 to 1992 had dual class share structures. Furthermore, many firms had takeover defences
in place at the time of the IPO.
39 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001 document that many seemingly friendly block transfers in Germany
involve a considerable amount of hostility.
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higher following a tender oﬀer, the blockholder and the rival strictly prefer to trade
the block. It allows them to appropriate a larger share of the takeover gains because
the block trade bypasses the small shareholders who would otherwise free-ride. Thus,
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) show that the choice how to transfer corporate
control may itself be subject to agency problems. Consequently, the reported gains
for small shareholders in block trades imply neither that firm value is maximized nor
that a block trade is the best feasible outcome.
3.3. Tendering Minority Blocks
Once negotiations over the block trade have failed, say due to ineﬃcient bargaining,
the minority blockholder has the option to compete for control or to decide whether
to accept the rival’s (uncontested) oﬀer. He may choose not to compete because he
lacks the financial resources or managerial capabilities. Alternatively, he may be an
institutional investor, such as a pension fund, that is prevented from taking over a
firm. In what follows, we explore how the presence of a ‘passive’ minority shareholder
who merely decides whether or not to tender aﬀects the outcome of the tender oﬀer.
Relative to the outcome with a fully dispersed ownership, the presence of a minor-
ity shareholder is immaterial if, as in Grossman and Hart (1980b), private benefits and
post-takeover share value are exogenous. To succeed, the rival must attract enough
shares from the small shareholders. Hence, he must oﬀer a price equal to the post-
takeover share value, which is given and independent of the rival’s final shareholdings.
The minority blockholder’s tendering decision is irrelevant, as he is not decisive for
the outcome.
The presence of a ‘passive’ minority blockholder only matters if the supply of
tendered share increases with the bid price. As shown in Section 2.2, ineﬃcient
extraction of private benefits generates an upward-sloping supply curve. Using this
framework, Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2006) show that the presence of a minor-
ity shareholder can increase the bid price.40 Since the rival must induce (some of) the
small shareholders to tender, their free-riding behaviour implies that the bid price
must equal the post-takeover share value. As a result, the rival’s optimal strategy is
to acquire as few shares as necessary. He cannot make a profit on the tendered shares
and the private benefits decrease with his final holding.
The positive relationship between post-takeover share value and the rival’s final
holding implies that the blockholder’s tendering decision interacts with those of the
small shareholders. If the blockholder tenders more shares, the small shareholders
tender fewer shares to restore the match between post-takeover share value and bid
price.
40 Models with atomistic shareholders who have diﬀerent (expected) opportunity costs of tendering
due to varying liquidity needs or tax rates also yield an upward-sloping supply curve (Stulz 1988;
Hirshleifer and Titman 1990). In such a setting, the presence of minority blockholders can also aﬀect
the equilibrium bid price. For example, if the blockholder has the highest opportunity cost of tendering,
the bid securing a 50% supply of the shares increases (Stulz 1988; Stulz, Walkling, and Song 1990).
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Relative to the small shareholders, the blockholder has stronger incentives to tender
his shares, given that the bid succeeds. His gains from tendering additional shares are
twofold; the bid price for these shares and the value appreciation of all his remaining
retaining shares, as the additional tendered shares increase the rival’s final holding,
leading to a higher post-takeover share value. This implies that, in equilibrium, the
blockholder sells all his shares in a successful takeover.
Since the rival attempts to take over the firm with as few shares as necessary, selling
all shares can make the blockholder decisive for the tender oﬀer outcome. If the
blockholder anticipates that he is decisive, he does not tender unless the bid price
is above the (per-share) value of his block prior to the takeover. Hence, his presence
imposes an additional condition that a successful bid must satisfy. The condition can
be binding because the blockholder enjoys private benefits. In this case, the rival
has to increase the bid price either until the blockholder favours the oﬀer as he is
compensated for the forgone private benefits, or until the oﬀer attracts enough shares
(50 per cent) from the small shareholders, making its success independent of the
blockholder’s decision. A larger minority stake and larger private benefits increase
the bid premium that the rival has to oﬀer to succeed.
From the small shareholders’ perspective, such blockholder resistance comes with
the benefit of a higher takeover premium but also with the cost of a reduced
takeover likelihood. The empirical research on the impact of managerial and outside
blockownership oﬀers conflicting findings. For instance, Stulz, Walkling, and Song
(1990) document that institutional ownership aﬀects target firms’ gains negatively,
in conflict with the findings of Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). Mikkelson and
Partch (1989) and Song and Walkling (1993) show that targets have lower managerial
ownership than non-targets, while Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find that neither
managerial ownership nor institutional holdings are related to takeover likelihood.
Finally, the presence of a blockholder also constitutes a binding constraint for
value-decreasing rivals. As above, the rival must increase the bid price either to win
the blockholder’s support or to attract enough shares from the small shareholders.
The higher price may deter some value-decreasing rivals. Otherwise, it reduces or
even eliminates takeover losses for target shareholders. Thus, the presence of a mi-
nority blockholder mitigates the pressure-to-tender problem.
4. Concluding Remarks
.............................................................................................................................................
Manne (1965) argues that the market for corporate control promotes eﬃcient utiliza-
tion of corporate resources. Takeovers remove managers who either pursue their own
goals or fail to make the best use of the firm’s resources. In addition, the mere threat of
a takeover disciplines managers and thereby mitigates agency problems in large public
corporations. This view is, however, too narrow and biased, as closer examination
09-Frexias-c09 OUP148-Freixas-et-al (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 288 of 297 July 4, 2007 10:46
288 mike burkart and fausto panunzi
of the takeover process in subsequent research reveals. There are impediments to
an eﬀectively operating takeover market such as the free-rider problem pointed out
by Grossman and Hart (1980b). In addition, the existence of a market for corpo-
rate control can induce behaviour that is detrimental to eﬃciency like managerial
entrenchment or underinvestment in firm-specific human capital. Thus, the overall
conclusion is ambivalent: The takeover mechanism gives rise to both beneficial and
adverse eﬀects: it disciplines managers and allows a more eﬃcient use of corporate
assets, but it also exacerbates the agency problem and triggers ineﬃcient actions.
Moreover, the empirical evidence on many controversial issues is not conclusive
enough to give clear answers.
On reflection, the inconclusive verdict is hardly surprising. The separation of own-
ership and control inevitable entails agency problems, and takeovers are a mechanism
to mitigate these problems. However, takeovers, like other governance mechanisms
such as boards or large active shareholders, are not free of agency problems. For
instance, most takeovers are not undertaken by corporate raiders but by firms headed
by professional managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1991). Hence, takeovers may also serve
the purpose of empire building. That is, takeovers can be the cure of an agency
problem, but also the symptom of an(other) agency problem. Similarly, the bidders’
ability to divert corporate resources as private benefits helps to overcome the free-
rider problem. While this promotes takeovers and enhances their disciplinary power,
it also creates or exacerbates the agency problem between shareholders and the new
controlling party.
Among a number of unresolved issues in the takeover literature, two stand out
as the most fundamental. First, empirical studies document substantial gains to
target shareholders, but the sources of these gains have not been fully identified. On
the one hand, there is no systematic evidence that improvements in post-takeover
operating performance can account for the target shareholder gains. On the other
hand, the documented losses to stakeholders, such as employees or bondholders, only
explain a modest fraction of the shareholder gains. Clearly, a better understanding of
how takeovers create shareholder wealth is important and a prerequisite for a more
informed assessment of their eﬃciency eﬀects.
Second, theoretical work puts forward that the takeover threat gives rise to various
conflicting eﬀects, such as disciplining managers vs. sacrificing long-term profitabil-
ity. As many of these benefits and costs of an (in)active takeover market are indirect
and economy-wide, they are diﬃcult to prove or refute empirically. Indeed, there
is still little consensus about the eﬀects of takeover defences on shareholder wealth,
despite the large number of papers on this topic. This applies also to the broader
question of the eﬃciency eﬀects of takeover defences on operating decisions and
firm performance, and more generally, the question of the impact that the takeover
threat and variations thereof have on firm behaviour. More work addressing these
challenging issues is warranted.
This essay also discusses the much smaller body of work analysing takeovers of
firms whose ownership structure is not completely dispersed. When the blockholder
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owns a majority of the votes, control is obviously not contestable, and a control
transfer only occurs with his consent. Ineﬃcient control transfer can take place and
eﬃcient control transfer may fail to take place because the trading parties do not take
into account that a control transfer has a negative or positive externality on the wealth
of the minority shareholders.
If control is contestable, the presence of a minority blockholder can promote or
hinder a control transfer. In case of a substantial minority block, control can be
transferred either through a (hostile) tender oﬀer or through a block trade. Both
blockholder and new controlling party prefer to trade the block because it excludes
the small shareholders from a larger share of the takeover gains. That is, the acquirer
benefits from the presence of a blockholder as it enables him to circumvent the
free-rider problem. The reverse conclusion obtains in cases where a tender oﬀer
is, for one reason or another, the only option available to an acquirer. In case of
a passive blockholder who values the status quo highly, the acquirer must oﬀer a
higher price either to win the blockholder’s support or to attract enough shares
from the small investors so that this support is no longer needed. In case of a
competing blockholder, the bidding contest is biased against the acquirer as the initial
stake commits the blockholder to bid aggressively. Thus, fewer takeovers occur when
ownership is partially concentrated, compared to the case of completely dispersed
ownership.
These predictions are consistent with broad-brush empirical evidence. For in-
stance, the level of takeover activity in continental European countries is lower
than in the USA or UK, though there seems to exist an active market for share
blocks.
Large (controlling) shareholders are an obstacle to an active market for corporate
control. Accordingly, breaking up concentrated ownership structures to promote
takeovers has been advocated in the (European) governance debate as a means to
further restructuring and, more generally, the capacity for adaptation (e.g. European
Commission 2002). However, any proposal must take into account that corporate
governance systems vary from country to country. Each system consists of many
interacting components, making the eﬀectiveness of a given mechanism highly de-
pendent on the overall system. That is, the absence of large shareholders per se
neither ensures that an active takeover market evolves, nor that it performs its de-
sired governance role. An eﬀective takeover mechanism requires further institutions,
such as strong (legal) protection of investors, transparency, disclosure, and unbiased
enforcement of contracts. Furthermore, in (continental European) countries where
these institutions are weaker, partial ownership and control concentration are the
main mechanism to constrain managerial behaviour. Thus, the role of takeovers—
or large shareholders for that matter—as a disciplining mechanism must ultimately
be analysed within the overall governance system. Obtaining a better understanding
of the interaction among diﬀerent mechanisms and of the relative performance of
diﬀerent systems is the fundamental challenge that corporate governance research
faces.
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